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THE SPELUNCEAN EXPLORERS

"Danger invites rescue."

1883

Wagner v. InternationalRy. Co., 133 N.E.

437, 437 (N.Y. i921).

Second, my sister Stupidest Housemaid would look to deterrence.
You can bet that if these defendants were convicted of murder for the
death of the rescuers, that would make future billionaires think twice
and three times about risking their lives in balloons and the like. In
terms of incapacitation, we need not worry about those same billionaires doing it again. As for rehabilitation, the death penalty probably
would not achieve that end, but three out of four ain't bad.
Of course there are some gaps to fill, like the fact that defendants
were not charged with killing the workers. But these are the kind of
meaningless legal formalisms that my sister Stupidest Housemaid disdains. As she is fond of saying, "When you is sittin on top, you can
spit on them below and they can't spit back." (Actually, she says
something very close to this, but I changed one little word out of a
sense of decorum.) To which I would add, "If you gonna spit, don't
spit in the wind." Which is by way of saying: How does it help the
cause of the poor, of the oppressed, of the people of color, to let these
four rich white guys walk when the law pretty clearly says they're
guilty? It seems to me that my sister Stupidest Housemaid got bit by
the white man's bug: "[W]hen white folks sacrifice white lives for the
greater good, it's a big confusing problem." Id. at 1923. But Justice
Stupidest Housemaid doesn't need to make "a big confusing problem"
out of it. She can simply apply the white folks' law to these white
folks and -

according to her own lights -

they'd get their just de-

serts. Why should the stupidest housemaid work so hard to pull her
master's chestnuts out of the fire?
SUNSTEiN, J.* The defendants must be convicted. Their conduct
falls within the literal language of the statute, and the outcome is not
so absurd, or so peculiar, as to justify this Court in creating, via interpretation, an exception to that literal language. Whether a justification or excuse would be created in more compelling circumstances is a
question that I leave undecided. I also leave undecided the question
whether the defendants might be able to mount a separate procedural
challenge, on constitutional grounds, to the death sentence in this case.
In the process of supporting these conclusions, I suggest a general
approach to issues of this kind: Apply the ordinary meaning of statutory language, taken in its context, unless the outcome is so absurd as
to suggest that it is altogether different from the exemplary cases that

* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago, Law School and
Department of Political Science.
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account for the statute's existence, or unless background principles, of
constitutional or similar status, require a different result.

I
I confess that I am tempted to resolve this case solely by reference
to the simple language of the statute that we are construing. The basic
question is whether the defendants have "willfully take[n] the life," N.
C. S. A. (N. S.) § 12-A, of another human being. At first glance, it
seems clear that the statutory requirements have been met. Perhaps
we should simply declare the case to be at an end.
An approach of this kind would have the benefit of increasing certainty for the future, in a way that reduces difficulty for later courts,
and also for those seeking to know the content of the law. This approach enables people to plan and keeps the law's signal clear; the increased certainty is an important advantage. Such an approach also
tends to impose appropriate incentives on the legislature to be clear
before the fact and to make corrections after the fact. I would go so
far as to suggest that a presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning
of enacted law, taken in its context, is a close cousin of the void-forvagueness doctrine,1 which is an important part of the law of this jurisdiction with respect to both contracts and statutory law. By insisting on the ordinary meaning of words, and by refusing to enforce contracts and statutes that require courts to engage in guessing games, we
can require crucial information to be provided to all relevant parties,
and in the process greatly increase clarity in the law.
Nor is this a case in which a statutory phrase is properly understood as ambiguous or unclear. We do not have a term like "equal,"
"reasonable," or "public policy," whose content may require sustained
deliberation or even change over time. It may be possible to urge that
the statutory term "willfully" creates ambiguity, but I cannot see how
this is so. There is no question that the defendants acted willfully under any possible meaning of that term. There is nothing wooden, or
literal in any pejorative sense, in saying that the words here are clear.
I have been tempted to write an opinion to this effect and to leave
it at that. But both principle and precedent make me unwilling to
take this route. As a matter of principle, it is possible to imagine cases
that fit the terms of this statute but for which the outcome is nonetheless so peculiar and unjust that it would be absurd to apply those
terms literally or mechanically. In any case, our own jurisprudence
forbids an opinion here that would rest entirely on the statutory text.
For centuries, it has been clear that the prohibition in N. C. S. A. (N. S.)
I The presumption in favor of plain meaning and the void-for-vagueness doctrine are cousins
because both are designed to promote rule of law values and, in particular, to give the legislature
an incentive to speak clearly.
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12-A does not apply to those who kill in self-defense, even though
there is no express statutory provision making self-defense a legally
sufficient justification. Our conclusion to this effect is based not on
literal language, but on the (literal) absurdity of not allowing selfdefense to count as a justification. Those justices who purport to be
"textualists" here are running afoul of well-established law; I cannot
believe that they would remain "textualists" in a genuine case of selfdefense.
Nor is it clear that the statute would apply, for example, to a police
officer (or for that matter a private citizen) who kills a terrorist to protect innocent third parties - whether or not there is an explicit provision for justification or excuse in those circumstances. Where the
killing is willful, but necessary to prevent a wrongdoer from causing
loss of innocent life, a mechanical or literal approach to this statute
would make nonsense of the law. A statute of this breadth creates a
risk not of ambiguity, but of excessive generality - the distinctive sort
of interpretive puzzle that arises when broad terms are applied to
situations for which they could not possibly have been designed and in
which they make no sense.
A possible response would be that to promote predictability, excessive generality should not be treated as a puzzle at all; we must follow
the natural meaning of the words, come what may. But as I have suggested, our self-defense jurisprudence makes this argument unavailable
in the current context. But put the precedents to one side. In ordinary
parlance, people routinely counteract excessive generality, and thank
goodness for that. For example, a parent may tell his child: "Do not
leave the house under any circumstances!" But what if there is a fire?
A judge may tell his law clerk: "Do not change a single word in this
opinion!" But what if by accident, the word "not" was (not?) inserted
in the last sentence? Interpreting statutes so as to avoid absurdity
could not plausibly undermine predictability in any large-scale or
global sense. Nor is it clear that absurdity would be corrected by the
legislature before or after the fact. Whether the legislature would correct the absurdity is an empirical possibility, and it is no more than
that. Even the most alert people have imperfect powers of foresight,
and even the most alert legislature cannot possibly anticipate all applications of its terms.
I conclude that when the application of general language would
produce an absurd outcome, there is a genuine puzzle for interpretation, and it is insufficient to invoke the words alone. The timehonored notion that criminal statutes will be construed leniently to the
criminal defendant strengthens this point. I am therefore unwilling to
adopt an approach that would, in all cases, commit our jurisprudence
to taking statutory terms in their ordinary sense.

§

1886

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

112:1834

II

As I will suggest, the key to this case lies in showing that the best
argument for the defendants is unavailable, because a conviction here
would not be analogous to a conviction in the most extreme or absurd
applications of the statutory terms. But before discussing that point, I
pause to deal with some alternative approaches. Tr-oubled by a conviction in this case, the defendants and several members of this Court
have urged some creative alternatives. It is suggested, for example,
that under the extreme circumstances of the collapse of the cave
opening, the law of civil society was suspended and replaced by some
kind of law of nature. See supra, at 1855 (Foster, J.). To the extent
that this argument is about a choice of law problem, I do not accept it.
There is no legitimate argument that the law of some other jurisdiction
applies to this case, and I do not know what is meant by the idea of
the "law of nature." The admittedly extreme circumstances themselves
do not displace the positive law of this state. Extreme circumstances
are the stuff of hard cases, and what makes for the difficulty is the extreme nature of the circumstances, not anything geographical. The
question is what the relevant law means in such circumstances, and to
say that the law does not "apply" seems to me a dodge. The view that
extreme circumstances remove the law's force is a conclusion, not an
argument.
Nor is this a case in which a constitutional principle, or a principle
with constitution-like status, justifies an aggressive construction of the
statute so as to make it conform to the rest of the fabric of our law.
When a statute poses a problem of excessive generality, a court may
properly avoid an application that would raise serious problems under
the Constitution, including, for example, the Equal Protection Clause,
the First Amendment, or the Due Process Clause. If a legislature intends to raise those issues, it should be required to focus on them with
some particularity. Though it cuts in a different direction from the
"plain meaning" idea, this principle is also a close cousin of the voidfor-vagueness doctrine, designed to require legislative, rather than
merely judicial, deliberation on the underlying question. But there is
no such question here.
Several members of this Court emphasize the "purpose" of the law.
See, e.g., supra, at 1857 (Foster, J.). They claim that the defendants
should not be convicted because while their actions fall within the
statute's letter, they do not fall within its purpose. I have considerable
sympathy for this general approach, which is not terribly far from my
own, and I do not deny that purpose can be a helpful guide when
statutory terms are ambiguous. Statutes should be construed reasonably rather than unreasonably, and when we do not know what statutory terms mean, it is legitimate to obtain a sense of the reasonable
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goals that can be taken to animate them and to interpret them in this
light.
But there are two problems with making purpose decisive here.
First, there is no ambiguity in the statutory terms; when text is clear,
resort to purpose can be hazardous. Second, the purpose of any statute can be defined in many different ways and at many levels of generality; and at least in a case of this kind, it is most unclear which
characterization to choose. Is the purpose of this statute to reach any
intentional killing? Any intentional killing without sufficient justification? Any intentional killing not made necessary by the circumstances? To reach willful killings while at the same time limiting judicial discretion? To make the world better on balance? Any answer to
these questions will not come from the statute itself; it is a matter not
of excavating something but of constructing it. Where the statute is
not ambiguous, we do best to follow its terms, at least when the outcome is not absurd. It is that question to which I now turn.

Thus far, I have urged a particular view of this case: the statute
contains no linguistic ambiguity. At most, the statute raises the distinctive interpretive problem created by excessive generality. We have
long held that self-defense is available by way of justification. It is
unclear whether - and we need not decide whether - the statute
would or should be inapplicable to some other cases in which a life
was taken "willfully" in order to prevent the death of innocent people.
For purposes of analysis let us assume, without deciding, that the statute would and should not be so applied. The question then is whether
this case is sufficiently like such cases. If it is, then we will have to
reach the difficult question of whether an exemption would be allowed
in those extreme cases.
In cases that seem to raise a problem of excessive generality, it is
often useful to proceed by identifying the exemplary or prototypical
cases, that is, the cases that are most clearly covered by the statute. I
do not mean to suggest that a statute's reach is limited to such cases;
generally it is not. But an identification of the prototypical or exemplary cases can help in the decision whether an application is so far
afield as to justify an exemption. The exemplary or prototypical cases
within the purview of this statute include those of willful killing of an
innocent party, motivated by anger, greed, or self-interest. It is also
possible to imagine cases that are at an opposite pole but that seem
covered by the statute's literal language: when a defendant has killed
someone who has jeopardized the defendant's own life, we have a legally sufficient justification under our law, no matter what the statute
literally says. And why would cases of this kind be at the opposite
pole? The answer is that, in such cases, the victim of the killing is
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himself an egregious wrongdoer, one whose unlawful, life-threatening
misconduct triggered the very killing in question. In such a case, application of the ban on willful killing would indeed seem absurd. It is
hard to identify a sensible understanding of the criminal law that holds
a defendant criminally liable in such circumstances. In fact, the law
recognizes a legally sufficient justification in such circumstances, despite the literal language of the statute. If this case were akin to those
at this pole, I have suggested that we would have an exceedingly hard
question.
But - and now I arrive at the crux of the matter - we have here
a quite different situation. The victim was not a wrongdoer, and he
did not threaten innocent persons in any way. His death was necessary only in the sense that it was necessary to kill an innocent person
in order to permit others to live. The question is not whether we
would agree, if we were legislators, to apply the statute in such situations; to overcome the ordinary meaning of the statutory terms, the
question is whether it would be absurd or palpably unreasonable to do
so. The clear answer is that. it is not.
It is hardly absurd to say that there is no legal justification or excuse for a willful killing in a situation like this one, even if more people on balance will live (or the killing is otherwise justified by some
cost-benefit calculus). Many people who engage in killing can and do
claim that particular excuse. To be sure, this case is different from the
exemplary or prototypical ones in the sense that the killing was necessary to save lives. But there is nothing peculiar or absurd about applying the law in such circumstances. People with diverse views about
the criminal law should be able to accept this claim. Those who believe in retribution and those who believe in deterrence should agree
that the outcome, whether or not correct, is within the domain of the
reasonable. Retributivists and Kantians are unwilling to condemn
someone who has killed a life-threatening wrongdoer. But retributivists and Kantians could certainly condemn the defendants here, who,
to save their own lives, took the life of a wholly innocent person, one
who withheld his consent at the crucial moment. For the retributivist,
those who have killed, in these circumstances, have plausibly committed a wrongful act, even if that act was necessary to save a number of
lives. It is not unreasonable to say that the victim deserved to be
treated as something other than a means to other people's ends. At
the very least a conviction could not, for a retributivist, be deemed absurd.
For their part, those who believe in deterrence should concede that
a verdict of "innocent" could, in the circumstances of this case, confuse
the signal of the criminal law and hence result in more killings. Many
people who willfully kill believe that the outcome is justified on balance, and we should not encourage them to indulge that belief. A
judgment that N. C. S. A. (N. S.) § 12-A protects all blameless victims
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creates a clear deterrent signal for those whose independent judgments
may not be trustworthy. From the point of view of deterrence, applying the statute in this instance would, at the least, not be absurd,
which is sufficient to justify my conclusion here.
I would not entirely exclude the possibility that the defendants
would have had a legally sufficient excuse if the unfortunate proceedings had been consensual at all times. It is conceivable that the absurdity exception would apply in that event as well. But this case is
emphatically not that one, because the victim's consent was withdrawn before the dice were thrown. At that point, the victim expressly said that he did not wish to participate in this method of deciding who would live or who would die. Where, as here, there was
no consent to participate in the process that led to an unconsented-to
death, the answer is clear: Those who killed acted in violation of the
statute.
Thus, it should be possible for those with diverse views of the purpose of the criminal law to agree that there is nothing absurd about
following the ordinary meaning of the statutory text here. Indeed, I do
not understand any of those justices who disagree with my general
conclusion to disagree with this particular point. Their disagreement
stems not from a judgment of absurdity, but from a willingness to disregard the text and to proceed in common law fashion - a willingness
that would, in my view, compromise rule-of-law values. For example,
Justice West urges the need for an individualized hearing, not because
she thinks the conviction absurd, but in order to ensure individualized
justice. See infra, at 1899 (West, J.). Justice Easterbrook thinks this
case is analogous to self-defense, see infra, at 1913 (Easterbrook, J.),
but he seems to take our jurisprudence to mean that courts may make
particularized inquiries into the circumstances of killings. He does not
suggest that a conviction would be absurd. I do not understand Justice Stupidest Housemaid or Justice De Bunker to find absurdity here.
And while I very much agree with Justice De Bunker's suggestion that
criminal statutes should be narrowly construed, see infra, at 1902 (De
Bunker, J.), I would apply that suggestion only in cases of genuine textual doubt.
Some members of this Court plainly believe that the killing was
morally excusable, because it was necessary in order to ensure that
more people would live, and because the victim originally designed the
plan that led to his death. See, e.g., infra, at 1916-17 (Easterbrook, J.).
But that moral argument cannot be taken to override the natural
meaning of the statutory terms, at least where the outcome is one that
reasonable people could regard as justified. A serious underlying concern here is that to allow an exception on the claimed principle would
be likely to undermine the statutory prohibition, either in principle or
in practice. In principle, it is at least unclear that an exemption in this
case could be distinguished from a claimed exemption in other cases in
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which our moral judgments would argue otherwise. (Consider, for example, a case in which someone shot, in cold blood, a person whom
the killer reasonably believed to be conspiring to kill others.) In practice, the deterrent value of the law might well be undermined by such
an exemption, and it is at least possible that some people would kill in
the belief or hope that they would be able to claim an exemption.
Cost-benefit analysis has its place, but when a statute forbids "willful
killing," we ought not to allow anything like a cost-benefit exception.
A kind of "meta" cost-benefit analysis may well support this judgment. If courts engaged in individualized inquiries into the legitimacy
of all takings of life, law would rapidly become very complicated, and
the deterrent value of the statute might start to unravel - especially if
prospective killers are at all attentive to the structure of our jurisprudence. I have considerable sympathy for Judge Easterbrook's approach to this case; in most ways his approach tracks my own, and I
have been tempted to accept his conclusion as well. We part company,
I think, only because I am more concerned about the increased uncertainty and muffled signals, for courts and prospective killers alike, that
would come from finding an "exception" here. See id. at 1914-15. I
fear the systemic effects of his (not unreasonable) view about this particular case.
An implication of my general approach is that the interpretation of
statutes, or rules, has an important analogical dimension. The difference between rule interpretation and analogical reasoning is far from
crisp and clean. In the interpretation of rules, the ordinary meaning of
the terms presumptively governs; but when the application at hand is
entirely different from the exemplary or prototypical cases, the ordinary meaning may have to yield. In deciding whether the application
is in fact different, we are thinking analogously. But because it is reasonable to think that this case is analogous to the exemplary ones because it involved the taking of an innocent life - we do best to follow the statutory language.
It is for this reason that I do not believe that we should at this time
consider legal challenges to the death sentence, as opposed to the conviction, in this case. Justice West has eloquently argued that the death
sentence is constitutionally illegitimate. See infra, at 1897-99 (West,
J.). I am not sure that she is wrong; nor am I sure that she is right.
Most of the time, the Constitution does not permit litigants to "open
up" rule-bound law by arguing that it is unreasonable as applied and
asking for an individualized hearing on its reasonableness as applied to
them. A doctrine that would permit frequent constitutional attacks on
rule-bound law would threaten the rule of law itself - increasing unpredictability, uncertainty, and (because judges are merely human)
threatening to increase error and injustice as well. There can be no
assurance that judges will reach the right outcome once all the facts
emerge for individualized decision. But the death penalty is a distinc-
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tive punishment (to say the least), and the facts of this case are not
likely to be repeated. Perhaps a degree of individualized judgment is
constitutionally required before anyone may be sentenced to death. I
would be willing to think long and hard about a separate challenge to
the death sentence as applied; but I would not decide that issue where,
as here, the defendants' challenge is to the conviction rather than the
sentence.
IV
It is my hope that a decision of the case along the lines I am suggesting would impose some pressure on other institutions to design a
statute that makes reasonable distinctions to which this provision,
standing on its own, appears oblivious. This is in fact a virtue of the
species of textualism that I have endorsed here: the creation of incentives for lawmakers, rather than courts, to make appropriate judgments about the numerous cases that fall within law's domain.
WEST, J.* Trapped in a cave, on the verge of starvation, with no

credible hope of timely rescue, five speluncean explorers resolve that
their only hope of survival is to eat one of their own. They determine
to do so and to throw dice to identify who will be the sacrificial lamb.
One member then denounces the plan and withdraws his participation.
The group proceeds over his objection, with his dice being thrown for
him by another. The dissenting member, by bad luck, loses the throw,
is killed, and is eaten by his comrades. The group is soon rescued and
hospitalized, but only after the accidental deaths of eight of the rescuers seeking to secure their release. The survivors are now charged
with murder or, as defined by the relevant statute, with "willfully
tak[ing] the life," N. C. S. A. (N. s.) § 12-A, of another human being,
punishable in all cases by death.
Under our procedural rules, and acting within its discretion, the
jury convened for this case requested that it be relegated only to the
role of fact-finder, leaving this Court to determine the legal conclusions. The jury found the facts as briefly recounted above, and it is
now our obligation to determine whether the defendants' conduct constitutes murder. If we decide that it does, then the mandatory punishment under the statute is death, unless commuted to a lesser penalty
by the governor of the state.

*

Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.

